The Post-Imperial Age: The Great Powers and the Wider World by J.P.D. Dunbabin

Author:J.P.D. Dunbabin [Dunbabin, J.P.D.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, General, Political Science, International Relations
ISBN: 9781317892939
Google: R9QFBAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-07-15T16:05:51+00:00

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Middle East in the 1950s

SECRET ISRAELI–EGYPTIAN CONTACTS (1952–6); US–BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE ARAB–ISRAELI TENSIONS

If relations between Israel and its neighbours remained both hostile and dangerous, a number of efforts were made in the early 1950s to bridge the gap. The two most important catalysts were the 1952 Egyptian revolution and the 1953 advent of the Eisenhower administration. Israel welcomed the new Egyptian regime, and established contacts with it (chiefly in Paris). Through these Israel offered compensation for the refugees and a right of passage across the Negev. In return it sought free use of the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, the lifting of the economic boycott (instituted by the Arab League in 1950) and the ending of threats of war. Egypt’s response was more nebulous: in 1953–4 it expressed interest in ‘a peaceful solution’ and wished to avoid border trouble, but said it could not afford publicly to deviate from the Arab consensus or relax the blockade (though it held out hopes of gradual progress and eventual passage of Israeli ships). Nasser told the US Ambassador in 1953 that ‘although an eventual settlement with Israel is in his mind, his present contacts are for informational purposes only … in his opinion, any peace settlement is still a long way off. What Egypt most sought, at this stage, was Israel’s good offices with the USA and help in inducing Britain to evacuate the Canal Base1.

In fact the prospect of evacuation alarmed Israel, once it became clear that it would not be combined with a treaty providing for general freedom of navigation. Israeli intelligence, probably acting autonomously, fire-bombed British and US property in Egypt in July 1954 to destroy British confidence in the Egyptian regime and so stall the evacuation process. This murky episode, known in Israel as ‘the affair’, soon came to light with the arrest of some of the agents involved.2 Equally Egypt had, after temporary compliance with a 1952 UN Security Council Resolution, again tightened restrictions on the transport of goods for Israel through the Canal in neutral ships. So in September 1954 Israel sent the Bat-Galim to transit the Canal in the vain hope of prompting Great Power intervention; it was confiscated, and its crew imprisoned for three months. In December 1954 Nasser told Israel that these developments made its proposals untimely. But he still expressed interest in maintaining contact, and 1955 saw, for instance, a fruitless shuttle between Cairo and Jerusalem by a private US citizen, Elmore Jackson.

The Eisenhower administration determined ‘that Israel will not, merely because of its Jewish population, receive preferential treatment over any Arab state’, and resolved to seek ‘a progressive reduction in [Arab-Israeli] tension … leading to conditions under which ultimate peace may be secured’.3 As a first step it favoured a scheme for the shared usage of Jordan basin waters that would also permit substantial refugee resettlement on newly irrigated land. Trouble arose in September 1953 when Israel started works to divert water from within the demilitarised zone

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